

# The Political Consequences of Ethnically Targeted Incarceration: Evidence from Japanese-American Internment During WWII\*

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## Abstract

What are the downstream political consequences of state activity explicitly targeting a racial or ethnic minority group? This question is well studied in the comparative context, but less is known about the effects of racist state activity on minority groups in liberal western democracies such as the United States. We investigate this question by looking at a significant and tragic event in American history—the mass internment of people of Japanese descent during World War II. We find that Japanese Americans who were interned are significantly less likely to have faith in government or be politically active and this demobilizing effect increases with internment length. In terms of the mechanism behind this demobilization, we find that camp experience matters: those who went to camps that witnessed violence or strikes had sharper declines in faith in government, levels of interest in U.S. politics, and willingness to protest against internment. Taken together, our findings both contribute to a growing literature documenting the demobilizing effects of ethnically targeted incarceration and expand our understanding of these forces within the U.S.

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\*Comments and suggestions welcome.

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# 1 Introduction

As immigrant populations have expanded across liberal democracies, there has been a concurrent rise in the use of punitive policies targeting immigrant and ethnic minority populations. Among various methods, scholars have identified putatively illiberal practices such as indefinite detention (Welch, 2002), the corralling of unauthorized immigrants into crowded holding facilities (Bosworth and Turnbull, 2014), and reinforcement of border fencing and barriers that create hostile conditions for migrants (Roche, 2014). These contemporary policies highlight important tensions within liberal democracies over whether the rights and protections conferred to long-standing majority groups extend to immigrant “newcomers” and their progeny; these tensions have revealed themselves throughout history and continue to raise questions about the universal scope of democratic principles (Epstein, 2016).

The internment by the U.S. government of people of Japanese descent is a key historical case that frames the difference between American democratic principles and practice in sharp relief. In June of 1942, approximately 120,000 people of Japanese descent, the majority of whom were U.S. citizens living along the U.S. West Coast, were sent to internment camps throughout the American interior (Weglyn, 1976). Although this internment faced legal challenges as well as civil disobedience and mass protests, it was not until the end of World War II that internment camps were shut down. By then, hundreds of thousands of people had been displaced and their lives severely disrupted by the state. This included not just adults, but also teenagers and children—many of whom had spent formative years living in military camps.

Despite both the historical significance of this event and recent growing use of detention centers along the U.S.-Mexico border and elsewhere in the world (Sampson and Mitchell, 2013), relatively little research in political science has examined the downstream political consequences of such episodes within liberal democracies. Many studies in comparative politics have examined forced migration and the internment of racial or ethnic minorities, coming to the conclusion that such migrations serve to further inflame inter-ethnic conflict and reduce the trust that racial and ethnic minority groups express toward not just majority groups, but also toward the state

(Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Zhukov and Talibova, 2018). In addition, a growing literature within American politics has examined the crippling impact of incarceration and other punitive encounters with governments on affected populations (Lerman and Weaver, 2014; White, 2019*b*). This literature—although focused primarily on penal institutions (as opposed to military ones)—has found that state-sponsored incarceration has profound effects on downstream political engagement, depressing the political engagement not just of those incarcerated but also that of their extended families (White, 2019*a*).

The context of Japanese internment provides an important instance within American history to explore the effects of a systematic and ethnically targeted policy on subsequent political attitudes and behavior. First, the internment of Japanese-Americans during WWII was a large-scale government activity, putting it on par with ethnically driven state activity in a comparative context. In addition, such episodes are more rare in liberal democracies, thereby affording an unusual glimpse in assessing the impact of ethnic targeting outside the more well-studied context of authoritarian or weak states. Moreover, the legacy of Japanese-American internment provides useful variation: not only was there variation in who was interned, but, conditional on original location, Japanese American families were mostly exogenously assigned to one of 10 War Relocation Authority (WRA) camps throughout the U.S. We leverage this variation to explore how conditions associated with internment impacted Japanese-Americans' subsequent attitudes and behavior.

We find several factors suggesting that this state-sanctioned racist activity has had extensive downstream repercussions. First, exploring which Japanese Americans did (or did not) live within the exclusion zone, we find that simply being interned has had a lasting, large, and significant depressing effect on political engagement. Second, conditional on internment status, we find that an additional year of internment is associated with a sizable decrease in political interest and political trust. Third, to further explore why internment could be demobilizing, we examine the nature of the camps themselves. We find that being assigned to a camp in which violence or unrest erupted resulted in greater political disengagement. This suggests to us that a key pathway to disengagement is the condition of the camp itself—with more unrest among internees being

linked to lower engagement. Surprisingly, we do not find similar effects for exposure to militaristic environments. This suggests that the collective social experience of internees, rather than simple exposure to a militarized physical environment, forms the foundation of the demobilizing effect.

This paper makes several contributions. First, we link disparate literatures from comparative politics with scholarship on American politics, explaining how state-sponsored racial targeting can have negative downstream consequences on political engagement even within a large liberal democracy such as the U.S. Second, our research shows that the severity of these experiences matters, such that more adverse conditions in sites of state captivity produce more sizable effects over time. Third, our study provides an unprecedented opportunity to assess theories of “carceral contact” using a case where the psychological linkages between the internment and the government’s role are strong. Our findings therefore have strong implications for current-day governments’ use of detention centers, including those confining migrants. Lastly, our findings engage a growing literature on Japanese-American public opinion, questioning the link between Japanese-Americans’ historically high political engagement and the history of internment.

This paper proceeds as follows. We first provide a review of the comparative literature on ethnic conflict, in tandem with a growing literature on the political consequences of the American “carceral state” as well as the literature on Japanese-American political behavior. We then provide context on the WWII Japanese-American internment process and provide an overview of our data, which include novel data on the conditions of the camps and their surrounding environments. Then, we present our main results showing that internment status predicts subsequent political disengagement and that, among those interned, the duration and severity of the internment does as well. We next provide an analysis showing that unrest appears to play a key role in furthering this demobilization. Finally, we demonstrate that our design assumptions are robust to several challenges as well as alternative explanations. We conclude by noting how our work informs other findings on the carceral policies in western democracies.

## 2 How Ethnically Targeted State Activity Could Impact Minority Group Behavior

States have historically exercised control over ethnic minority groups via targeted repression and violence during periods of social upheaval, mass migration, or war (Levy, 1988; Arendt, 1973; Reeves, 2015). Scholars have explored the political and psychological effects of these efforts, with some studies revealing that repression can politically mobilize targeted minority groups (LeBas, 2006; Davenport, 2005; Blattman, 2009; Bellows and Miguel, 2009) and others suggesting demobilizing effects (Lyall, 2009). While this literature has shed light on the potential political impacts of violence and repression on targeted communities, recent work has drawn attention to the importance of regime strength and whether repression efforts are carried out by state actors. As Zhukov and Talibova (2018) note, empirical examinations of the repression-mobilization link have traditionally selected cases of ethnic targeting perpetrated by non-state actors or weak states.

However, we know surprisingly little about the impact of large-scale repression efforts by “strong” states on minority groups’ political participation. Focusing on the mass deportation of ethnic minorities during the Stalin Era, Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) and Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov (2017) find that punitive encounters with the Soviet Union during the 20th century continue to have positive and durable effects on group attachments and support for minority leaders among targeted groups.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, these studies find that exposure to forced migration durably affects voting patterns, such that those who experienced violence in the past report lower levels of support for pro-Russian parties in the contemporary period.

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<sup>1</sup>Among the various methods states use to repress ethnic groups, their capacity to move groups is especially effective (McGarry, 1998). As McGarry (1998) notes, forced migration can dilute the power of ethnic minorities, allow states to reassert sovereignty over disputed territories, increase protection against external threats, and reduce ethnic conflict. Unsurprising, then, studies exploring the effects of state-directed ethnic targeting have gravitated toward forced migration as a relevant opportunity to test theories of repression.

## 2.1 Ethnic Targeting in Liberal Democracies

A potential limitation of this literature has been its focus on authoritarian regimes—where opportunities to express grievances are limited and state repercussion can be severe. Even within liberal democracies, however, minority groups have collided with punitive institutions and experienced the consequences of ethnic targeting (Zakaria, 1997; Twibell, 2004; Mann, 2005; Soss and Schram, 2007). For example, an arena that possibly speaks to our inquiry is the contemporary status of Jews in Europe, who were targets of ethnic atrocities by fascist Germany but many of whom continue to live in Europe today. The literature on the downstream effects of the Holocaust on Jewish political participation is scarce but suggests that French Jews, for instance, are more politically engaged than the general population (Schnapper, Bordes-Benayoun and Raphael, 2011).

Moving to the present day, the past few decades have seen liberal democracies banning forms of religious dress (Nanwani, 2011), increasing the surveillance and deportation of migrants (Kalhan, 2013), and sidestepping due process in the name of national security (Radack, 2004). The detention of migrants in camps has become more widespread across Australia, the U.S., and Europe (Sampson and Mitchell, 2013). Despite increases in such policies targeting particular ethnic groups, it is unclear whether the effects of ethnic targeting and repression translate across different kinds of political systems. On the one hand, “threat-mobilization” studies in the U.S. have shown that policies targeting ethnic groups can increase minority political participation (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura, 2006; White, 2016). Consistent with some of the existing literature on ethnic violence (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017), prominent theories posit that punitive policies increase the salience of ethnic identities, thereby strengthening the link between group attachments and voting patterns (White, 2016).

On the other hand, research on “custodial citizenship”—which includes literature exploring the downstream consequences of state-sponsored incarceration on minority populations—has found that direct experience with racially disparate criminal justice policies can have demobilizing effects (Uggen and Manza, 2002; Hjalmarsson and Lopez, 2010; Burch, 2013; Lee, Porter

and Comfort, 2014; Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel, 2014; Kupchik and Catlaw, 2015). According to this perspective, contact with the criminal justice system serves as a “political socialization experience” that erodes trust in government by exposing minority groups to aggressive elements of otherwise democratic systems (Lerman and Weaver, 2014).

We note that, in contrast to cases of ethnic targeting in comparative contexts, where state-directed efforts are intended to encompass entire groups, this literature in American politics has focused on policies that target specific subsets of minority populations. As Maltby (2017) argues, this complicates our ability to assess the political effects of punitive policies because “policy recipients” often differ in important ways from other group members who do not directly experience the policy. In addition, despite significant racial disparities in the criminal justice system (Soss and Weaver, 2017), a minority of blacks and Latinos are incarcerated. Moreover, restrictionist immigration policies tend to target unauthorized immigrants who comprise a relatively small proportion of the broader immigrant population. The potential mismatch between contemporary cases of racial or ethnic targeting in liberal democracies and similar cases in comparative politics muddles the transportability of theories and expectations across political systems. In addition, existing studies assess contact with punitive institutions in a binary fashion (i.e., contact v. no contact). However, as Weaver, Hacker and Wildeman (2014, 19) note, scholars have yet to “move beyond treating incarceration as a uniform treatment” and leverage “variation in the character of custodial interactions, not just their incidence.” We take up this invitation below.

## **2.2 Japanese-Americans, Internment, and Expectations**

The case of Japanese-American internment during WWII makes an urgent and compelling case to study these topics. First, unlike instances in authoritarian regimes, the Japanese-American case took place in a relatively well-functioning liberal democracy.<sup>2</sup> Second, the internment of

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<sup>2</sup>Of course, many scholars have noted subnational authoritarianism in the U.S. South during the 20th Century (Mickey, 2015). In addition, American history is replete with other examples of racial targeting, including the targeting of Native Americans, Asian immigrants (e.g., the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 which respectively curtailed Chinese and Japanese immigration), and Latino/as, as well as more localized targeting of white immigrants. Religious minorities (for example, Mormons) also have historically also been targeted by the state.

Japanese Americans involved the explicit targeting of an entire ethnic group, a contrast with ostensibly race-neutral targeting (such as policing or even immigrant detention centers). Lastly, Japanese Americans remained in the U.S. following their internment, enabling us to evaluate subsequent political participation.

In this regard, Japanese-American political behavior has been the subject of scholarly research, with several studies have finding a high baseline level of political engagement. For example, Wong et al. (2011, p. 18-20), report that, among Asian Americans, “Japanese Americans are the likeliest group to be registered to vote and to report voting,” with registration, turnout, and engagement rates far outpacing U.S. averages (Wong et al. (2011), Table 1.1). This activism has translated into political officeholding: “many Japanese Americans ran for elected office and, by 2008, the majority of Asian American elected officials were of Japanese descent” (Wong et al., 2011, p. 48). However, the same authors also report that “among national-origin groups...Japanese (11 percent) are the most likely to report being a victim of a hate crime” (Wong et al., 2011, p. 169).

Several scholars have linked political engagement among Japanese Americans back to internment. For example, Wong et al. (2011) argue that Japanese Americans as a group “are characterized by relatively high socioeconomic status, as well as stark historical experiences of racial discrimination, including the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II” (p. 180). Within cultural anthropology, Takezawa (1991) points to the movement for redress as a unifying event for many third-generation Japanese Americans; “the ethnicity of the Sansei today is constructed not merely from racial and cultural markers of pre-war days,” she notes, “but from a sense of suffering of their forebears who experienced internment” (p. 41). As one of the Japanese Americans that she interviews notes, “My parents went to the camp, that affected me indirectly. Now I have become closer to the Japanese American community, whereas originally before the redress [movement], I wouldn’t say that I was very much close to the community” (quoted in Takezawa, 1991, p. 48).

That both direct and indirect experience with internment should yield comparable effects across generations is supported by other literature. General orientations toward politics such

as partisanship and political cynicism are correlated across generations (Jennings and Niemi, 1968); relationships that are strengthened within politicized families (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009). Moreover, as research on pre-adult political socialization has shown, intensive exposure to highly salient political events can crystallize attitudes toward policies and candidates, closing attitudinal gaps between adolescents and adults (Sears and Valentino, 1997). Furthermore, in the aftermath of state violence and repression, group attachments, perceptions of victimhood, and feelings of threat are correlated across generations, despite a lack of direct experience with victimization among younger generations (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017).

Taken together, the literature is in agreement that internment was, and is likely to be, an important political event for those who experienced it as well as their descendants. However, in terms of downstream impact on political engagement, the literature suggests two divergent possibilities. First, in line with the comparative politics literature as well as the literature on Asian American public opinion, we expect first-hand internment experience to have had a *galvanizing effect* on Japanese-American political involvement. That is, internment was a seminal event that fomented a shared ethnic identity and raised Japanese-American political consciousness, leading to greater political engagement, activism, and political leadership. On the other hand, more in line with the literature on state-sponsored incarceration and its impact on American minority communities, we may expect that Japanese-American internment resonates more strongly with findings on custodial citizenship, creating a strong and significant *depressive effect* on subsequent political engagement among those affected. Both of these are highly important: as the U.S. and other liberal democracies turn to internment in targeting minority and migrant populations, scholars must be aware of the possible downstream political consequences of these actions for these communities. We now turn to investigating these possible outcomes.

### **3 Japanese-American Internment Context and Data**

Following the attack by Japanese air forces on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the United States entered World War II on December 8, 1941. In this racially and politically charged environment, and with

the encouragement of top military officials, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942 authorizing the militarized internment of people of Japanese descent. Thus began the forcible relocation of more than 110,000 people of Japanese descent—the majority (62 percent) of whom were American citizens—into years-long internment into military camps.

Public Proclamation 1, issued on March 2, 1942 by pro-internment U.S. Army General John L. Dewitt, created two distinct military “exclusion zones.” Military Area 1 included swaths of the west coast of the United States deemed sensitive for military purposes. This included the coasts of California, Washington, and Oregon, as well as the Southern sections of California and Arizona (Kashima et al., 2012). The remainder of these states constituted Military Area 2. Initially, all of those Japanese Americans living in Area 1 were under mandatory evacuation, but eventually all California-based Japanese Americans fell under the military order. Japanese Americans living further inland in Washington and Oregon, as well as those living away from the West Coast were not subject to evacuation or internment.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, as the historical map in Figure 1 shows, the eventual exclusion zone covered the entire state of California along with western sections of Washington, Oregon, and Nevada. Because Japanese Americans disproportionately lived in California and other coastal areas, this had the effect of including the vast majority of people of Japanese descent in the exclusion zone. Specifically, over 110,000—more than 86 percent—of Japanese Americans resided within the final exclusion zone and were thus relocated from their homes; California alone contained around 73 percent of the total Japanese American population living in the continental United States (Ruggles et al., 2019).

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<sup>3</sup>While approximately 2,000 Japanese Americans living in Hawaii were interned in the continental United States, the U.S. Army did not forcibly relocate the vast majority of Hawaii’s approximately 158,000 ethnically Japanese residents (Scheiber, Scheiber and Jones, 2009). Instead, Hawaii’s governor declared martial law in 1941, placing the territory under the command of the U.S. Army and subjecting the population to strict curfews, mail censorship, the requirement to carry special government-issued identification, and other restrictions. An internment camp was constructed near Ewa on the Island of Oahu in 1943. Several hundred internees were held at the Honouliuli Internment Camp, but the camp was used primarily to detain prisoners of war (Provost Marshal, “Vital Statistics: POW Compounds, Prisoners of War, and Internees in Hawaiian Islands,” Japanese Cultural Center of Hawai’i Resource Center, Archival Collection 19, Box 9, Folder 30).




Figure 1: Historical map of the two military areas as well as the location of the Japanese-American internment camps. Source: Weglyn (1976).

**Internment Camp Site Selection.** The U.S. Army began to scout locations that could collectively accommodate 100,000 people in the spring of 1942. Sites suitable for internment had to be far from strategic military targets on the West Coast, large enough to house thousands of internees, and connected to public utilities. Because of these pressures, the U.S. Army focused on developing sites with these features already in place. Accordingly, all but four of fifteen assembly and relocation centers were located in pre-existing fairgrounds, stockyards, and exposition

centers (Ng, 2002), all in remote locations.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 1 shows the locations of the 10 eventual “War Relocation Centers,” while Table 1 summarizes several camp characteristics. As the table shows, some camps had more military-style infrastructure, including watch towers and buildings dedicated to military use. We operationalize the level of structural militarism in camps by recording the numbers of watch towers per 1,000 people in each camp. We also draw upon multiple historical resources to identify relocation centers that experienced violence among internees, violence between internees and civilians, or the use of force by military personnel against internees. The strikes, violence, and force columns represent indicator variables for whether or not each event occurred in the camps. Violence represents violence between internees or violence between internees and the surrounding civilian population.<sup>5</sup>

Table 1: Internment Camp Characteristics

Camp	State	Peak Pop.	Births	Deaths	Guard Towers	Military Bldgs.	Strikes	Use of Force	Violence
Amache	Colorado	7,318	415	106	6	15	0	0	0
Crystal City	Texas	4,000	153	17			0	0	0
Jerome	Arkansas	8,497	239	76	7	12	0	0	1
Fort Sill	Oklahoma	707					0	1	0
Heart Mountain	Wyoming	10,767	550	182	9	19	1	0	0
Minidoka	Idaho	9,397	489	193	8	15	0	0	0
Livingston	Louisiana	1,123					1	0	0
Lordsburg	New Mexico	2,500					1	1	0
Manzanar	California	10,046	541	146	8	13	0	1	1
Rohwer	Arkansas	8,475	418	168	8	12	0	0	0
Tule Lake	California	18,789	1,490	331	19	63	1	1	0
Poston	Arizona	17,814	793	300	0	12	1	0	1
Gila River	Arizona	13,348	662	221	1	15	0	0	0
Topaz	Utah	8,130	384	139	7		0	1	0

Sources: Ishizuka 2016, Burton, et. al. 2002, Densho Encyclopedia  
(see [http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Fort.Sill\\_\(detention\\_facility\)/](http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Fort.Sill_(detention_facility)/)),  
New Mexico Office of the State Historian,  
(see <http://newmexicohistory.org/places/lordsburg-internment-pow-camp>)

In addition to these camp characteristics, we also incorporate into our analyses other contex-

<sup>4</sup>Tule Lake, for instance, was built as a New Deal work relief program camp in 1933, well before the U.S. Government began responding to any potential Japanese military threats.

<sup>5</sup>At the Jerome Relocation Center in Arkansas, a tenant farmer fired into a group of Japanese-American internees on a work detail outside of the camp because he believed members of the group were trying to escape. While a camp supervisor was present, the incident represents violence against internees initiated by a civilian rather than a member of the camp guard and is coded as violence rather than use of force.


tual features, including the percent of the surrounding county that was white (according to the 1940 U.S. Census), the percent of the county-level vote-share won by Franklin Roosevelt in the 1940 presidential election, and whether the camp was located in the South. We use these camp characteristics in Section 6.3.

**Camp Assignment.** The U.S. Army began evacuations on March 31, 1942 using a consistent procedure (Daniels, 1993). First, Army personnel posted signs displaying the Exclusion Order for a designated zone throughout the area. Exclusion Orders informed people with Japanese ancestry (in practice, people who were at least 1/16 Japanese) that they were required to register themselves and their families and prepare for transfer. In the two days following, the head of each household would report to a control center near his or her home, register, and receive instructions for relocation. Evacuees were given six days to travel to one of sixteen assembly centers located throughout California, Oregon, and Washington. Internees spent an average of 100 days in an assembly center before being transferred to a permanent internment camp (Kashima et al., 2012).

Importantly for analyses that follow, with rare exceptions for family reunification and suspicion of disloyal behavior, evacuees were transferred from assembly centers to internment camps according to criteria unlikely to be correlated with their personal, cultural, or economic backgrounds. Evacuees in assembly centers with the most dangerous conditions (e.g., no indoor plumbing or fire hazards) were moved to internment camps first (Burton, 2000). U.S. Army records suggest that it made efforts to move evacuees waiting at Assembly Centers to the nearest internment camps with climates closest to what they had known at home (Burton, 2000). Beyond these two concerns, families were assigned—together when possible—to internment camps that were (1) sufficiently complete in terms of construction to house evacuees and (2) had room for them. To illustrate, two Japanese-American families from the same neighborhood in Los Angeles were likely to have been assigned to the same assembly center, but may have been sent to different internment camps. We see direct evidence of this in the War Relocation Authority's records. Figure 2 shows that internees from Los Angeles County were primarily sent to the nearby assembly centers (left) in Manzanar, Pomona, and Santa Anita. The same internees were distributed

across a variety of internment camps (right) in Arizona (Gila River, Poston), Colorado (Granada), Wyoming (Hearth Mountain), and Arkansas (Rowher, Jerome).

Figure 2: Internees from Los Angeles County



### 3.1 Data Sources and Key Variables

Our primary interest is in how the internment experience impacted the political behavior and attitudes of those interned and their direct descendants. For this, we draw on the Japanese American Research Project (JARP), a nationally representative multi-mode survey of 4,153 mainland Japanese Americans that was conducted in 1967. Although these data are older, we use JARP for several reasons. First, these data were collected at a time period when many of those who were interned were still alive and possibly politically active, thus allowing us to evaluate the political engagement of those who experienced internment first-hand. Indeed, making inferences about the direct internment experience using contemporary data would be impossible; as of our writing, even the youngest interned Japanese Americans—those interned as very young infants—would

be approaching 75 years old. Second, other surveys of Asian Americans—including those in the contemporary period—tend to be underpowered with regards to Japanese Americans. Third, JARP includes information about where respondents lived between 1932 and 1941, which allows us to leverage exogenous variation in camp assignment (Shoag and Carollo, 2016). Lastly, the study allows us to evaluate whether the effects of internment on political engagement persist decades after the experience because it includes three generations of people of Japanese descent interviewed long after the last internment camps closed. The three generations in the sample are the following: (1) Issei (Japan-born immigrants, or first generation immigrants from Japan), (2) Nisei (individuals born to Japan-born immigrants, or second generation), (3) Sansei (third generation). Given the intergenerational nature of the survey, we selected the outcomes described below because they were present in at least two of the survey forms (i.e., Issei, Nisei, or Sansei). Key features of the JARP data are summarized in Table 2.

The JARP data are, however, constrained in that camp assignment is only available for Issei. In the results that follow, we link respondents in JARP using the survey’s family identifier field and assign the younger generations the internment camp reported by Issei members. That is, we assume that all members of the same family had the same internment status and were interned at the same place.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, the effects presented in Section 6 are direct effects of internment exposure for Issei respondents but transmitted effects of having a parent or grandparent interned for respondents of younger generations.

In addition to JARP, we use the War Relocation Authority’s records of Japanese internment in order to validate our results and provide richer descriptions of the internment experience.<sup>7</sup> The War Relocation Authority (“WRA”) and the Department of Justice recorded detailed personal information about internees, including age, gender, addresses prior to internment, family units, education, and occupation. These records contained assembly center and internment camp as-

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<sup>6</sup>This does not perfectly fit the data since some Nisei children would not have been living with their parents at the time of internment and might have been assigned to different locations, but it does reflect the U.S. Army’s general directive to keep families together when possible.

<sup>7</sup>See the Database of Japanese American Evacuees, Record Group 210, National Archives, <https://www.archives.gov/research/JapaneseAmericans/wra>.

Table 2: JARP Sample Demographic Information

Generation	Observations	Age	Gender	Married	California	Oregon	Washington	Other
Issei	1,047	72	0.66	0.57	723	47	127	150
Nisei	2,304	41	0.52	0.81	1,470	101	266	467
Sansei	802	22	0.47	0.30	104	2	24	672
Total	4,153	45	0.55	0.65	2,297	150	417	1,289

Notes: Age represents mean age; gender represents proportion male, and married represents proportion married. California, Oregon, Washington, and Other represent counts of Japanese-Americans living in each location on the eve of the internment period.

signment information for 109,384 Japanese Americans interned during WWII and are publicly available to researchers through the National Archives. Since the JARP is anonymous, we cannot link respondents to the survey directly to their corresponding WRA records, but we can use the WRA data to gain insight into the camp assignment process (Figure 2) and the geographic distribution of internees prior to the internment period (Section 6.3).

**Internment Status and Camp Locations.** Internment status is measured using a categorical item in the Issei form which asked Issei respondents whether they were subjected to the internment process. This item is coded as a binary item (1 = interned, evacuated, or both; 0 = otherwise). We use this item and family ID variables included in JARP to construct an intergenerational measure of internment status. In total, 83% of the sample experienced internment. Issei respondents to the JARP were asked to report the internment and/or relocation centers to which they were sent during the internment period.

**Covariates.** For precision, we also include respondent gender and respondent age, both recorded when respondents participated in the JARP survey waves. Age and gender are pre-treatment features of Japanese Americans who were subjected to internment that may also affect our outcomes of interest. (Age, for instance, is likely to affect political engagement independently of the internment experience.) JARP also surveyed Nisei respondents about which occupation they

held longest between 1932 and 1941. In models that rely solely on Nisei, we use this question to construct an indicator for whether Nisei respondents were primarily employed as farmers in the pre-internment period.<sup>8</sup> Finally, our analysis of camp-level effects relies on controls for respondents' place of residence on the eve of internment. Since the internment camp to which Japanese Americans were ultimately confined was plausibly orthogonal to pre-treatment characteristics of Japanese Americans themselves, it was largely a function of where they lived at the onset of WWII. To leverage this assumption, all of our analyses of camp effects control for pre-treatment area of residence.

**Outcome Variables.** Our main outcomes of interest concern political engagement, a topic about which we leverage several JARP questions. First, "political interest" is measured using a four-item ordinal scale ranging from "No interest at all" (0) to a "A great deal" (3) ( $\bar{x} = 1.31$ ;  $s = .82$ ). Second, "political engagement" is measured using a binary item asking respondents whether non-family members have asked them for advice regarding politics ( $\hat{p} = .17$ ). Third, "faith in government" is measured using a binary item asking whether respondents disagreed that "most people in government are not really interested in problems of the average man." ( $\hat{p} = .43$ ), and finally, preferences for dissent are measured using a trichotomous variable that captures whether respondents would have preferred a leadership strategy that emphasized dissent (-1), accommodation (1), or neither (0) ( $\bar{x} = .61$ ;  $s = .77$ ).

Specifically, JARP respondents were asked whether Japanese-American leadership should have, in retrospect, protested the circumstances of internment or cooperated with the U.S. government. Respondents could have answered that the best leadership strategy at the time would have been to protest internment (which we code using the value -1, for simplicity); they could have indicated that they were not sure what the best strategy was or that they couldn't generalize on this point (0), or they could have claimed that the best leadership during the period would have sought a peaceful and orderly transition [into internment facilities] (1). Seventy-nine percent of

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<sup>8</sup>No similar covariates can be constructed for Issei or Sansei. Issei were asked to report the principal occupation of their head of household across various periods, rather than their own. Sansei are only asked to report their current occupation at the time of the survey.

respondents who were asked this question agreed that a peaceful and orderly leadership approach was preferable.<sup>9</sup>

## 4 Effects of Internment Status

We first investigate the possible role internment status played in forming or structuring political engagement and political attitudes—that is, the relationship between being interned (or not) on political engagement, both among those who experienced the internment themselves and also their direct descendants. For this, we leverage the fact that nearly 86 percent of people of Japanese descent living in the continental U.S. were residing in the exclusion zone, but 14 percent were not. Although not causal, the variation allows us to assess the relationship between whether a person was sent to a camp and their subsequent political attitudes—a relationship that many scholars believe has galvanized Japanese Americans’ political engagement (Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee and Junn, 2011).

Table 3 reports estimates from a linear model regressing indicators of political engagement on internment status with pre-internment residential locations included as fixed effects. The table shows that those who were interned are about 13% of a scale point ( $\pm 9\%$  of a scale point) *less likely* to report an interest in American politics than those who were not, a statistically significant difference. On a scale from 0 to 3, this corresponds to a 4.3% movement across the political interest scale. Internment status is also associated with increased distrust, such that those who were interned are about 7 pp more likely to agree that the government is not interested in “problems of the average man” ( $\pm 7$  pp). The coefficient estimate for internment status on the likelihood of being sought out for political advice is approximately zero. However, there is considerable uncertainty around this estimate ( $\pm 5$  pp). As for the leadership approach outcome, those who were interned are about 12% of a scale point ( $\pm 11\%$  of a scale point) more likely to support a

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<sup>9</sup>While internees across several camps protested their lack of resources, working conditions, living conditions, and the pressure to enlist in the U.S. military, Japanese-American organizations generally cooperated with the U.S. government through the internment process. This phenomenon may likely have been driven, at least in part, by the same sense of hopelessness about the U.S. government’s willingness to serve Japanese-American citizens.

“peaceful and orderly” leadership approach during internment than one employing protest and dissent relative to those who were not interned. This corresponds to a 4% movement across the three-point scale.

Table 3: Internment Status and Political Engagement

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Political Interest	Political Distrust	Political Advice	Leadership Approach
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Internment Status	-.128*** (.046)	.066* (.036)	-.0001 (.027)	.117** (.056)
Survey Forms	Issei, Nisei, and Sansei	Nisei and Sansei	Nisei and Sansei	Nisei and Sansei
Controls	Age, Gender	Age, Gender	Age, Gender	Age, Gender
Pre-Internment Locations	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	4,094	3,064	3,063	2,976

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## 5 Effects of Internment Length

We next evaluate the association between internment *length* and political engagement, conditional on internment, using a linear model. We would suspect, in accordance with the literature on ethnic targeting (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017) and carceral contact in the United States (Weaver and Lerman, 2010), that longer internments will further serve to demobilize and depress civic engagement. After all, extremely brief detainments may have little effect, but longer internments may expose internees to ongoing injustice, recalibrating their political views toward the U.S., and perhaps souring them on future engagement (Weaver and Lerman, 2010). Table 4 provides summary statistics on internment length. Roughly 7 percent of internees in our sample were released within one year, while 61 percent were detained longer than three years.

Table 4: Internment Length Summary Statistics

Internment Length	N	Percentage of Interned Sample
Under 2 months	34	1.05
2 to 6 months	67	2.08
6 to 12 months	118	3.66
1 to 2 years	273	8.47
2 to 3 years	734	22.76
3 to 4 years	1772	54.95
4 years or more	227	7.04

The data show that those who were interned for longer periods had greater attenuation in political engagement, shown in Table 5. An additional year of being interned is associated with approximately 7% of a scale point decrease in political interest ( $\pm 3\%$  of a scale point), a 2 pp increase in distrust ( $\pm 2$  pp), and a 2 pp decrease in the likelihood of being sought out for political advice ( $\pm 2$  pp). To put this into context, those who were interned for the maximum amount of four years or more (7% of the sample) are approximately 28% of a scale point less likely to report an interest in American politics than those who were interned for fewer than two months (1% of the sample). This corresponds to a gap of about 9% on a 0 to 3 scale. Moreover, they are approximately 8 pp more likely to express distrust in government and 8 pp less likely to be sought out for political advice. With respect to leadership approach, an additional year of internment is associated with a 2% of a scale point ( $\pm 3\%$  of a scale point) increase in supporting a “peaceful and orderly” leadership approach versus one that emphasized protest. However, this estimate is not significant at conventional levels of statistical significance.

### 5.1 Exogeneity Tests for Internment Status and Length

Our analyses included pre-internment controls for age and gender, but it’s possible that there are demographic differences between JARP respondents across different levels of internment status and length. To assess this, we examined covariate balance across age, gender, and occupational

Table 5: Internment Length and Political Engagement

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Political Interest	Political Distrust	Political Advice	Leadership Approach
	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>OLS</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Internment Length	-.067*** (.014)	.024** (.011)	-.023*** (.008)	.020 (.017)
Survey Forms	Issei, Nisei, and Sansei	Nisei and Sansei	Nisei and Sansei	Nisei and Sansei
Controls	Age, Gender	Age, Gender	Age, Gender	Age, Gender
Observations	3,200	2,398	2,401	2,339

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

status across those interned and those not interned.<sup>10</sup> Tables 6 and 7 report difference-in-means estimates showing that demographic differences between those interned and not interned (as well as those interned for shorter and longer lengths) are small in magnitude and not statistically significant in the vast majority of cases. There is some minor imbalance with respect to age, such that those interned for longer periods of time appear to have been younger. We account for this in our models by controlling for age. Additional pairwise comparisons across different camps are reported in the Appendix.

Table 6: Internment Status

Variable	Standardized Difference in Means	t	p-value
1 Age	-0.07	-0.84	0.40
2 Gender	0.07	0.92	0.36
3 Farm Occupation	-0.01	-0.12	0.90

<sup>10</sup>We measure pre-internment occupation by creating a binary indicator for those employed as farmers before internment because this is, by far, the most common pre-internment occupation reported in the JARP sample and helps capture potential differences between rural and urban Japanese Americans. Roughly, 43% of respondents reported farm work as their occupation prior to the internment process.

Table 7: Internment Length

	Variable	Standardized Difference in Means	t	p-value
1	Age	-0.01	-2.23	0.03
2	Gender	0.00	0.58	0.56
3	Farm Occupation	-0.00	-0.09	0.93

## 6 Effects Associated With Internment Experience

What could explain the demobilizing effects associated with the internment experience? In this section, we examine the internment experience more closely. Not only does doing so shed light on how internment can lead to demobilization, but as we explained in Section 3, conditional on initial place of residence, assignment to one of the 10 WRA facilities was unrelated to individual (family) attributes (Shoag and Carollo, 2016). This allows us to estimate the causal effects of exposure to specific camp conditions on downstream political behavior in order to gauge possible mechanisms.

We expect that these conditions are substantively important in shaping political attitudes. Specifically, we isolate two key features based on first-hand accounts of the internment experience.<sup>11</sup> The first is the lived experience of people in the camps, including social interactions with other internees. Specifically, as we discussed in Section 2, a strong possibility is that internees living in camps that experienced more unrest or violence experienced greater demobilizing effects—a possibility explicitly raised, but so far largely unexplored, by the literature on incarceration and custodial citizenship (Weaver, Hacker and Wildeman, 2014). The second is the militarized features of the camp. As Table 1 shows, camps varied in their levels of security, which implies that evacuees living in different locations would have had varying intensities of exposure to militarized conditions—including not just physical space, but also exposure to military-style punishments. Both of these factors could shed light on possible pathways of demobilization. We examine each in turn.

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<sup>11</sup>See, for instance: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/seventy-years-after-manzanar-stories-incarceration-live-n461751>

## 6.1 The Lived Experience of Internment

We first consider the lived, social experiences of camp life (as somewhat distinct from the physical features of the camps). First-person accounts of the internment experience frequently emphasize two socially pertinent features: (1) the struggle to access basic resources and (2) witnessing (sometimes violent) widespread unrest among internees. On the first point, shortages of fuel, food, medicines, safe hospital facilities, and other necessities were widespread in internment camps. Flimsy and hastily-built living quarters meant that internees were given little protection from vermin and extreme weather (Pistol, 2017). Grievances over access to basic needs sparked strikes and demonstrations across several camps, which inflamed existing tensions among internee factions. At Tule Lake, agricultural workers protested authorities' unwillingness to adequately compensate the widow of a farm worker who had died in a trucking accident. Tule Lake's project director responded by using internees imprisoned at Poston and Topaz as strike breakers (Burton, 2000). Union leader Harry Ueno led inmates in an investigation of persistent sugar shortages in Manzanar and founded the Mess Hall Workers Union in 1942. Ueno's union (along with others across several of the camps) clashed with the broadly pro-American Japanese-American Citizens League ("JACL"). Tensions over resources and treatment by camp authorities led to larger-scale violence among internees on multiple occasions. Ueno himself was arrested for allegedly participating in the beating of JACL leader Fred Tayama, and inmates at Manzanar went on strike to demand his release (Burton, 2000). Importantly, these activities affected fairly large shares of a camp's population.

We expect that being imprisoned in a camp that witnessed large-scale strikes and/or violence among internees might be broadly demobilizing for several reasons. Internees who went on strike to protest resource shortages or ill treatment would have done so because they believed that camp authorities, the arm of the state with which they interacted most, were not committed to providing basic needs to internees. At Manzanar, Harry Ueno's committee found credible evidence that their sugar shortages had been caused, in part, by a camp official's smuggling sugar out of the camp for black market resale. Using the literature on the carceral state as a guide (Lerman and Weaver,

2014), experiences like this would have dampened faith in government and reduced the motivation to participate in politics. Similarly, violent disagreements *among* internees would have depressed political activity by straining communication and fostering resentments in the community.

**Political Distrust.** We first examine the impact of camp strikes or violence on political distrust. Figure 3a represents the results of an OLS regression of the binary indicator for political distrust on assignment to an internment camp in which a strike took place, along with pre-internment location, age, and gender for internees. Respondents who were interned in camps that experienced strikes, or who had Issei relatives interned in these camps, were approximately 8 pp ( $\pm 4$  pp) more likely to say that the government is not concerned with the issues facing everyday people. Similarly, internees imprisoned in camps that witness violent episodes amongst internees themselves were 4pp ( $\pm 7$  pp) more likely to report believing that the government had little concern for the problems faced by average people.

**Political Advice.** Respondents from the Nisei and Sansei generations were asked: “During the last few months, has anyone outside your family asked you for advice about politics or public affairs?” Respondents answered yes (1) or no (0). We treat this item as an indicator of the extent of political communication within the Japanese-American community. As Figure 3a shows, respondents associated with camps that witnessed strikes were 3 pp ( $\pm 2$  pp) less likely to report having been approached for political advice. This suggests that Japanese-Americans interned in camps that experienced strikes were less likely to engage in this form of direct political communication downstream. Though less significantly, respondents interned in camps that experienced violence among internees also reported lower rates (2 pp  $\pm 2$  pp) of being sought out for political advice.

**Preferences Over Leadership.** JARP asks respondents whether Japanese-American leadership should have, in retrospect, cooperated with the U.S. government or protested the circumstances of internment. Our results suggest that Japanese-American internees living in camps that experienced strikes or violent unrest were significantly more likely to favor leaders who espoused


peaceful and orderly transitions, perhaps because such respondents did not believe protesting would yield any concessions or because they feared retribution. As Figure 3a shows, internees and relatives of internees in camps that saw strikes during internment were 0.07 ( $\pm 0.05$ ) scale points (relative to the -1, 0, 1 scale) more likely to prefer leaders who fostered orderly transitions (into internment). Similarly, respondents interned in camps that experienced violence expressed significant preferences for leaders that fostered an orderly transition to internment. Internees who lived through violent episodes (or who were related to Issei that did) were 0.08 scale points ( $\pm 0.06$ ) more likely to support leaders who did not favor protest.

**Political Interest.** Our results present suggestive evidence that respondents interned in camps that experienced strikes are less likely to express high levels of interest in American politics. Figure 3a shows that respondents with experience in these camps were 5 pp ( $\pm 7$  pp) less likely to report being interested in American politics. These results lend some support to the hypothesis that the deprivation aspect of internment has a demobilizing effect on internees, but our point estimate is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Respondents who lived through violent episodes while they were interned, however, expressed significantly lower levels of interest in American politics than counterparts who did not experience violence. These respondents were 8pp ( $\pm 5$ pp) less likely to report interest in American politics.

## 6.2 Militarized Environment

Another jarring feature of the internment experience was living under heavily militarized conditions. These conditions manifested in physical space through the use of guard towers, barbed wire fencing, and barracks-style housing for internees. These physical elements served as “reminders of [internees’] lack of freedom” (Burton, 2000). In addition to this, internees lived under military supervision and military rule. Failure to abide by it resulted in retribution: in 1943, authorities at Tule Lake used tear gas, tanks, and machine guns to disperse a crowd of protestors. While the use of deadly force against internees was relatively rare, there are several examples of

Figure 3: Camp Effects: Lived Experience




individual internees who were wounded or fatally shot by guards during the internment period.

**Use of Force.** Previous work on the carceral state would suggest that these features, by instilling a sense of fear of the state—particularly in moments where internees attempt to organize and win concessions—would have politically demobilizing effects on internees. This prediction is not borne out by our results, represented in Figure 4b. Our point estimates of the effect of use of force by the military in internment camps on political distrust, advice, interest and preferences over leadership are close to zero and not statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5% level.

One reason we might observe demobilizing effects for violence among internees, but not for cases in which guards used force against internees, is the difference in scale. Episodes of violence among internees generally tended to precede or follow large demonstrations or involve large groups. Incidents in which guards used force against internees, in contrast, tended to be more isolated and rare. To give one example, one such incident coded in our data involves a guard at Topaz camp fatally shooting elderly internee James Wakasa for standing too close to a perimeter fence (Burton, 2000). Violent confrontations between large groups of internees would have exposed more internees to the altercations than isolated shootings involving few individuals.

Figure 4: Camp Effects: Militarized Conditions



**Militarized Space.** The results of our OLS estimates for the effect of militarized space (operationalized here as the number of guard towers per thousand internees at peak population) on political engagement appear in Figure 4a. These results provide some evidence that the effects of physical militarization counteracted the demobilizing effects of experiencing strikes and violence. Internees with relatives interned in more militarized camps were 8pp ( $\pm$  6pp) more likely to express interest in American politics. Similarly, these internees were 3pp ( $\pm$  2pp) more likely to report having been approached for political advice.

### 6.3 Robustness of the Results

In sum, these results lend support to a broad *demobilizing* effect associated with WWII internment, both for those who were actually interned and also to subsequent generations. Specifically those people who were interned have been substantially turned off political engagement across several forms and, of those who were interned and their families, those with connections to camps with tense interpersonal environments suffered the most significant loss in engagement. To this extent, our findings support the broader literature on custodial citizenship in the U.S.

We note, however, some threats to our assumptions below. These are (1) confounding in camp assignment and (2) differences in pre-internment locations.

**Robustness to Unobserved Confounders in Camp Assignment.** Relying on the historical record and following other work on internment (e.g., Shoag and Carollo, 2016), we assume that camp assignment is orthogonal to pre-internment characteristics at the individual level. However, a potential problem in interpreting these analyses would be if internees sent to different camps were fundamentally different on important characteristics impacting political engagement, even conditional on location.

We assess the validity of the assumption by checking whether camp assignment is related to any pre-treatment controls (such as age, gender, or occupation) that could also influence political engagement. In Table 16, we model camp assignment as a function of age, gender, and pre-internment location—the most relevant pre-treatment control variables we have access to in JARP. Values in Table 16 correspond to z-scores, calculated by dividing coefficients from the multinomial logit by their corresponding standard errors, for each covariate. In the age and gender columns, no camp is associated with a test statistic greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96. (Pre-internment location, on the other hand, *is* significantly associated with camp assignment in our model, but this is what we expect given the way camp assignment was carried out.)<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>These results only include internment camps to which at least 30 respondents in the JARP reported being assigned; estimates for camps with fewer assigned respondents are unlikely to be reliable. In the JARP data, pre-camp location is a three digit numeric code. We leave pre-camp location as a numeric variable in this model to preserve power; locations in the same region and state will be close in value and locations across states will differ considerably in value, which provides reasonable distinctions between different pre-camp locations.

Table 8: Covariate Balance Across Internment Camps


	Constant	Age	Gender (Male)	Pre-Camp Location
Jerome	-5.25	-.71	.95	.68
Heart Mountain	.47	.70	-.47	-.44
Minidoka	2.84	.27	.23	-.90
Manzanar	-2.11	.01	1.53	.09
Rohwer	-1.42	1.47	.43	-3.43
Tule Lake	-.56	.22	.55	-.54
Poston	5.22	-.26	.60	-.82
Gila River	.47	.17	-.42	-.46
Topaz	-1.91	.63	-.71	-.16

Note: Reference category is Granada (Amache)

In addition, plots of age, gender, and pre-internment occupations for internees held at different camps (displayed in Appendix Figures 8 and 9 and Appendix Table 15) reveal no significant differences in these distributions across different internment locations. This is confirmed in a series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests comparing the distributions. These analyses are included in the Appendix. This provides evidence for the assumption that camp assignment was a function of location (per Table 16, but not pre-treatment characteristics like age and gender

**Location Prior to Internment.** Identifying the effect of camp environment relies on the assumption that every Japanese-American who lived in roughly the same area on the eve of internment was treated the same way by the WRA, which prioritized rapid evacuation and proximity. Figure 5 provides evidence that supports this assignment mechanism. Each panel in Figure 5 displays the distribution of internees living in California, Oregon, and Washington, respectively on the eve of WWII. Panel (a) describes this information using the War Relocation Authority's records, while Panel (b) shows the same distribution using JARP data. If the assumption that the

Figure 5: Assignment to Internment Camp by State of Residence



U.S. Army prioritized proximity and rapid transportation from assembly centers to camps holds, then most internees from a given state should have been held in the camps closest to their state of residence.

This is borne out by the two figures. For example, Japanese Americans living in Oregon and Washington were sent to the northern-most camps in Tule Lake, Wyoming (Heart Mountain), and Idaho (Minidoka). Those living in California were sent to camps located near them - these would have included Manzanar, Poston, and Gila River for people living in southern California and Tule Lake for people living in the north. Lastly, we note strong correspondence between the two figures, giving us assurance that JARP self-reported data paints an accurate portrayal of internment assignment.

## 7 Alternative Mechanisms

Our analyses suggest that differences in political engagement among Japanese Americans varied not just by internment status, but also by features of the camps themselves. However, one potential threat to this interpretation is the possibility that the effects we observed are actually the result of another factor correlated with internment location.

Here, we believe that the likeliest alternative mechanism has nothing to do with the militarism of the camps themselves, but with the political and demographic conditions of the surrounding environment. That is, although camp locations were remote and internees had limited contact with civilians living nearby, it is possible that exposure to local political attitudes and local culture might provide a possible alternative conduit for the long term effects we report in Section 6. For example, if Japanese Americans were sent to camps located in extremely conservative areas, this might have a depressing impact in the political engagement of a more liberal-leaning group (Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee and Junn, 2011). Similarly, if Japanese Americans were sent to camps located in nearly exclusively white areas, this might have led them to have lowered feelings of shared fate, thereby suppressing political engagement.

We test for this possible alternative explanation by replicating our analysis but including as additional controls indicators for (1) the political climate and (2) racial composition of counties that held internment camps. We account for local political climate by including Franklin Roosevelt's 1940 share of the two-party vote in each camp's county. Similarly, we account for demographics by controlling for the proportion of the county's population in each internment camp county that was white in 1940.

Table 9 presents the results of OLS models that include these two political and demographic controls as well as our original individual-level covariates (pre-internment location, age, gender). These results are consistent with the results we presented in Section 6. We present a detailed comparison of our original results to the results from our robustness check using specific locations and the results from the robustness check including county-level political and demographic controls in Table 9. Standard errors in the original and county-level controls columns are clustered

by camp.

Table 9: Results and Robustness Checks Comparison

Outcome	Characteristic	Original	SE (Orig)	Location	SE (Location)	County Controls	SE (County)
Interest	Violence	-0.08	0.03	-0.07	0.02	-0.06	0.02
Interest	Force	-0.002	0.05	-0.02	0.02	0.13	0.03
Interest	Strikes	-0.05	0.03	-0.04	0.01	-0.02	0.03
Interest	Militarism	0.08	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.10	0.02
Political Distrust	Violence	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.04
Political Distrust	Force	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.06	0.04
Political Distrust	Strikes	0.08	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.07	0.02
Political Distrust	Militarism	-0.04	0.05	-0.06	0.02	-0.05	0.04
Leadership	Violence	0.08	0.03	0.10	0.02	0.05	0.03
Leadership	Force	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.02	-0.11	0.05
Leadership	Strikes	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.06	0.02
Leadership	Militarism	-0.01	0.05	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.04
Advice	Violence	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
Advice	Force	0.004	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03
Advice	Strikes	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.01
Advice	Militarism	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01

Comparing our results when we include county-level political and demographic characteristics to the results without these two covariates rarely changes our conclusions. Exceptions to this include the effect of witnessing (or being descendant of an interned Japanese-American who witnessed) the use of force within a camp on interest in politics, faith in government, and views of appropriate leadership. Still, in the second two cases, the effect of witnessing the use of force remains statistically indistinguishable from 0, which is consistent with our original findings.

## 8 Conclusion

After Pearl Harbor, raw racism and xenophobia led over a hundred thousand Japanese Americans and people of Japanese descent to be transported to militarized internment camps, where they were held—against their will and unconstitutionally—for years over the course of the Second World War. In this study, we explored the downstream consequences of this seminal, racist event, and one of the darkest episodes in American history. Did the extreme targeting by the state of one

minority group have downstream consequences on that group's political attitudes and political engagement?

Our findings suggest that the internment of Japanese Americans did indeed impact their subsequent political behavior, in ways that speak not just to scholarly discussions but also to ongoing current events. Our key findings are twofold. First, we examine the effects of such internment by comparing political engagement by those interned and their descendants versus those who didn't experience such internment. Conditional on pre-internment residential locations, we found that those interned and their families are less likely to express an interest in politics and prefer a confrontational strategy toward the government relative to those who were not interned. This suggests a strong depressing effect of internment status on Japanese Americans' political engagement. Second, we explored the impact of internment itself, conditional on people being interned. Leveraging the fact that, camp assignment was exogenous to individual or family characteristics conditional on pre-internment location, we find that internment length and camp conditions were associated with decreases in political interest, political trust, and confrontational leadership strategies. This suggests that the longer and more militarized the state contact was, the more the internment experience depressed political engagement among those Japanese Americans who were interned or who and family interned.

Our study makes several contributions to ongoing scholarly discussions. First, from the perspective of the comparative politics literature, our paper highlights the potential demobilizing effects of punitive interactions with the state in the unusual context of a liberal democracy. This is an important inquiry: to date, existing work on the topic of repression, violence, and ethnic targeting has mostly focused on weak states, with more recent studies considering the effects of authoritarian strong states such as the Soviet Union during Stalin's reign. Our findings dovetail with those of Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) and Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov (2017) who find that repression and violence increases distrust toward the state. (However, in contrast to Lupu and Peisakhin (2017), we do not observe increased mobilization and political engagement among members of the targeted group.) Future research could explore whether these differences be-

tween democracies and autocratic regimes are shaped by institutional variation or the nature of repression efforts.

Second, we also contribute to research in American politics examining the political consequences of growth in the carceral state. While much of this growing literature has viewed exposure to penal institutions in a binary fashion (contact versus no contact), we find evidence that conditions within these institutions matter, such that harsher conditions increase the likelihood of demobilization, distrust, and disengagement. Potential avenues for future research on the “carceral state” could assess whether variation in the severity and duration of punitive encounters with the state yield more dire consequences for affected groups.

Lastly, our paper contributes to an important and growing literature on Asian-American public opinion and political behavior. Previous work has demonstrated that Japanese Americans have high rates of political participation and leadership, with scholars positing that the group’s previous history of internment having a galvanizing effect within the Japanese American community (Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee and Junn, 2011). Our findings call this latter explanation into question. Indeed, our findings suggest that those with intimate or secondary contact with internment are, if anything, less likely to be engaged, trustful of the government, and politically participatory. This leaves open several questions that are worthy of further research—including whether Japanese Americans’ higher political engagement can be explained by other factors, or whether internment had galvanizing effects on those with no direct experience with internment, perhaps via the movement for redress (Takezawa, 1991).

We conclude by noting that our findings have relevance beyond scholarly discourse. Throughout liberal democracies, governments are increasingly turning to detention of minority groups as a public policy (Sampson and Mitchell, 2013). This includes state-sponsored detentions of migrants, group-based repatriation, refugee camps, and carceral policies that disproportionately impact members of minority groups. Our study—which shows that increased exposure and more militaristic exposure can have downstream depressing effects on political engagement—urges caution in this approach. Indeed, our work suggests that detentions that happen in the modern-day

could suppress political engagement among these groups for generations to come.

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## 9 Appendix

### 10 Internment Status Covariate Balance

The following figures and tables summarize balance in the distributions of age, gender, and employment sector among internees imprisoned across all 45 possible unique pairs of internment camps.

Figure 6: Age Distribution for Japanese Internees by Camp




Figure 7: Distribution of Pre-Internment Occupational Sectors by Camp




Table 10: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Results for Age

Camp 1	Camp 2	p-value
Rivers, AZ	Poston, AZ	0.53
Amache, CO	Poston, AZ	0.55
Denson, AR	Poston, AZ	0.80
Manzanar, CA	Poston, AZ	0.12
McGehee, AR	Poston, AZ	0.69
Heart Mountain, WY	Poston, AZ	0.11
Hunt, ID	Poston, AZ	0.39
Newell, CA	Poston, AZ	0.13
Topaz, UT	Poston, AZ	0.14
Amache, CO	Rivers, AZ	0.75
Denson, AR	Rivers, AZ	0.98
Manzanar, CA	Rivers, AZ	0.95
McGehee, AR	Rivers, AZ	0.31
Heart Mountain, WY	Rivers, AZ	0.20
Hunt, ID	Rivers, AZ	0.85
Newell, CA	Rivers, AZ	0.53
Topaz, UT	Rivers, AZ	0.20
Denson, AR	Amache, CO	0.83
Manzanar, CA	Amache, CO	0.47
McGehee, AR	Amache, CO	0.15
Heart Mountain, WY	Amache, CO	0.99
Hunt, ID	Amache, CO	0.92
Newell, CA	Amache, CO	0.90
Topaz, UT	Amache, CO	0.89
Manzanar, CA	Denson, AR	0.96
McGehee, AR	Denson, AR	0.39
Heart Mountain, WY	Denson, AR	0.44
Hunt, ID	Denson, AR	0.88
Newell, CA	Denson, AR	0.86
Topaz, UT	Denson, AR	0.55
McGehee, AR	Manzanar, CA	0.12
Heart Mountain, WY	Manzanar, CA	0.44
Hunt, ID	Manzanar, CA	0.67
Newell, CA	Manzanar, CA	0.75
Topaz, UT	Manzanar, CA	0.48
Heart Mountain, WY	McGehee, AR	0.03
Hunt, ID	McGehee, AR	0.11
Newell, CA	McGehee, AR	0.04
Topaz, UT	McGehee, AR	0.06
Hunt, ID	Heart Mountain, WY	0.66
Newell, CA	Heart Mountain, WY	0.32
Topaz, UT	Heart Mountain, WY	0.87
Newell, CA	Hunt, ID	0.95
Topaz, UT	Hunt, ID	0.38
Topaz, UT	Newell, CA	0.35

Table 11: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Employment Sector

Camp 1	Camp 2	p-value
Rivers, AZ	Poston, AZ	0.05
Amache, CO	Poston, AZ	0.05
Denson, AR	Poston, AZ	0.08
Manzanar, CA	Poston, AZ	0.09
McGehee, AR	Poston, AZ	0.54
Heart Mountain, WY	Poston, AZ	0.06
Hunt, ID	Poston, AZ	0.16
Newell, CA	Poston, AZ	0.99
Topaz, UT	Poston, AZ	0.38
Amache, CO	Rivers, AZ	0.99
Denson, AR	Rivers, AZ	0.86
Manzanar, CA	Rivers, AZ	0.88
McGehee, AR	Rivers, AZ	0.89
Heart Mountain, WY	Rivers, AZ	1.00
Hunt, ID	Rivers, AZ	0.97
Newell, CA	Rivers, AZ	0.20
Topaz, UT	Rivers, AZ	0.04
Denson, AR	Amache, CO	0.98
Manzanar, CA	Amache, CO	1.00
McGehee, AR	Amache, CO	0.96
Heart Mountain, WY	Amache, CO	1.00
Hunt, ID	Amache, CO	1.00
Newell, CA	Amache, CO	0.10
Topaz, UT	Amache, CO	0.06
Manzanar, CA	Denson, AR	0.98
McGehee, AR	Denson, AR	0.86
Heart Mountain, WY	Denson, AR	0.95
Hunt, ID	Denson, AR	0.78
Newell, CA	Denson, AR	0.10
Topaz, UT	Denson, AR	0.53
McGehee, AR	Manzanar, CA	1.00
Heart Mountain, WY	Manzanar, CA	0.99
Hunt, ID	Manzanar, CA	1.00
Newell, CA	Manzanar, CA	0.17
Topaz, UT	Manzanar, CA	0.23
Heart Mountain, WY	McGehee, AR	0.87
Hunt, ID	McGehee, AR	1.00
Newell, CA	McGehee, AR	0.65
Topaz, UT	McGehee, AR	0.43
Hunt, ID	Heart Mountain, WY	0.94
Newell, CA	Heart Mountain, WY	0.13
Topaz, UT	Heart Mountain, WY	0.02
Newell, CA	Hunt, ID	0.29
Topaz, UT	Hunt, ID	0.09
Topaz, UT	Newell, CA	0.38

Table 12: T-Tests for Differences in Gender Proportion by Camp

Camp 1	Camp 2	Difference in Means	Standard Error	T	p-value	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Rivers, AZ	Poston, AZ	0.03	7.95	0.004	1.00	-15.63	15.64
Amache, CO	Poston, AZ	0.02	7.96	0.002	1.00	-15.65	15.65
Denson, AR	Poston, AZ	-0.04	5.81	-0.01	1.00	-11.47	11.46
Manzanar, CA	Poston, AZ	-0.04	7.52	-0.01	1.00	-14.79	14.78
McGehee, AR	Poston, AZ	0.01	7.03	0.001	1.00	-13.83	13.83
Heart Mountain, WY	Poston, AZ	0.03	8.15	0.004	1.00	-16.01	16.02
Hunt, ID	Poston, AZ	0.01	8.55	0.001	1.00	-16.79	16.80
Newell, CA	Poston, AZ	-0.005	7.75	-0.001	1.00	-15.23	15.23
Topaz, UT	Poston, AZ	0.04	7.42	0.01	1.00	-14.60	14.61
Amache, CO	Rivers, AZ	-0.01	7.24	-0.002	1.00	-14.23	14.23
Denson, AR	Rivers, AZ	-0.07	5.52	-0.01	0.99	-10.91	10.88
Manzanar, CA	Rivers, AZ	-0.07	6.90	-0.01	0.99	-13.58	13.56
McGehee, AR	Rivers, AZ	-0.03	6.52	-0.004	1.00	-12.84	12.83
Heart Mountain, WY	Rivers, AZ	-0.001	7.38	-0.0001	1.00	-14.50	14.50
Hunt, ID	Rivers, AZ	-0.02	7.67	-0.003	1.00	-15.07	15.07
Newell, CA	Rivers, AZ	-0.04	7.08	-0.005	1.00	-13.92	13.91
Topaz, UT	Rivers, AZ	0.01	6.83	0.001	1.00	-13.43	13.44
Denson, AR	Amache, CO	-0.05	5.52	-0.01	0.99	-10.90	10.88
Manzanar, CA	Amache, CO	-0.06	6.90	-0.01	0.99	-13.58	13.56
McGehee, AR	Amache, CO	-0.01	6.52	-0.002	1.00	-12.84	12.84
Heart Mountain, WY	Amache, CO	0.01	7.39	0.002	1.00	-14.52	14.52
Hunt, ID	Amache, CO	-0.01	7.68	-0.001	1.00	-15.09	15.09
Newell, CA	Amache, CO	-0.02	7.08	-0.003	1.00	-13.93	13.92
Topaz, UT	Amache, CO	0.02	6.84	0.003	1.00	-13.45	13.45
Manzanar, CA	Denson, AR	-0.01	5.30	-0.001	1.00	-10.47	10.47
McGehee, AR	Denson, AR	0.04	5.16	0.01	0.99	-10.18	10.20
Heart Mountain, WY	Denson, AR	0.07	5.59	0.01	0.99	-11.01	11.04
Hunt, ID	Denson, AR	0.05	5.70	0.01	0.99	-11.24	11.26
Newell, CA	Denson, AR	0.03	5.43	0.01	1.00	-10.71	10.72
Topaz, UT	Denson, AR	0.08	5.34	0.01	0.99	-10.52	10.55
McGehee, AR	Manzanar, CA	0.05	6.24	0.01	0.99	-12.28	12.30
Heart Mountain, WY	Manzanar, CA	0.07	7.03	0.01	0.99	-13.81	13.84
Hunt, ID	Manzanar, CA	0.05	7.27	0.01	0.99	-14.30	14.31
Newell, CA	Manzanar, CA	0.04	6.74	0.01	1.00	-13.25	13.26
Topaz, UT	Manzanar, CA	0.08	6.54	0.01	0.99	-12.86	12.88
Heart Mountain, WY	McGehee, AR	0.02	6.63	0.004	1.00	-13.04	13.05
Hunt, ID	McGehee, AR	0.004	6.83	0.001	1.00	-13.44	13.45
Newell, CA	McGehee, AR	-0.01	6.40	-0.002	1.00	-12.59	12.59
Topaz, UT	McGehee, AR	0.03	6.22	0.01	1.00	-12.24	12.25
Hunt, ID	Heart Mountain, WY	-0.02	7.84	-0.003	1.00	-15.42	15.41
Newell, CA	Heart Mountain, WY	-0.03	7.22	-0.005	1.00	-14.19	14.18
Topaz, UT	Heart Mountain, WY	0.01	6.95	0.001	1.00	-13.68	13.68
Newell, CA	Hunt, ID	-0.01	7.48	-0.002	1.00	-14.72	14.71
Topaz, UT	Hunt, ID	0.03	7.19	0.004	1.00	-14.14	14.15
Topaz, UT	Newell, CA	0.04	6.70	0.01	0.99	-13.17	13.18

## 11 Balance Test Results

The following figures and tables summarize balance in the distributions of age, gender, and employment sector among internees imprisoned across all 45 possible unique pairs of internment camps.

Figure 8: Age Distribution for Japanese Internees by Camp




Figure 9: Distribution of Pre-Internment Occupational Sectors by Camp




Table 13: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Results for Age

Camp 1	Camp 2	p-value
Rivers, AZ	Poston, AZ	0.53
Amache, CO	Poston, AZ	0.55
Denson, AR	Poston, AZ	0.80
Manzanar, CA	Poston, AZ	0.12
McGehee, AR	Poston, AZ	0.69
Heart Mountain, WY	Poston, AZ	0.11
Hunt, ID	Poston, AZ	0.39
Newell, CA	Poston, AZ	0.13
Topaz, UT	Poston, AZ	0.14
Amache, CO	Rivers, AZ	0.75
Denson, AR	Rivers, AZ	0.98
Manzanar, CA	Rivers, AZ	0.95
McGehee, AR	Rivers, AZ	0.31
Heart Mountain, WY	Rivers, AZ	0.20
Hunt, ID	Rivers, AZ	0.85
Newell, CA	Rivers, AZ	0.53
Topaz, UT	Rivers, AZ	0.20
Denson, AR	Amache, CO	0.83
Manzanar, CA	Amache, CO	0.47
McGehee, AR	Amache, CO	0.15
Heart Mountain, WY	Amache, CO	0.99
Hunt, ID	Amache, CO	0.92
Newell, CA	Amache, CO	0.90
Topaz, UT	Amache, CO	0.89
Manzanar, CA	Denson, AR	0.96
McGehee, AR	Denson, AR	0.39
Heart Mountain, WY	Denson, AR	0.44
Hunt, ID	Denson, AR	0.88
Newell, CA	Denson, AR	0.86
Topaz, UT	Denson, AR	0.55
McGehee, AR	Manzanar, CA	0.12
Heart Mountain, WY	Manzanar, CA	0.44
Hunt, ID	Manzanar, CA	0.67
Newell, CA	Manzanar, CA	0.75
Topaz, UT	Manzanar, CA	0.48
Heart Mountain, WY	McGehee, AR	0.03
Hunt, ID	McGehee, AR	0.11
Newell, CA	McGehee, AR	0.04
Topaz, UT	McGehee, AR	0.06
Hunt, ID	Heart Mountain, WY	0.66
Newell, CA	Heart Mountain, WY	0.32
Topaz, UT	Heart Mountain, WY	0.87
Newell, CA	Hunt, ID	0.95
Topaz, UT	Hunt, ID	0.38
Topaz, UT	Newell, CA	0.35

Table 14: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Employment Sector

Camp 1	Camp 2	p-value
Rivers, AZ	Poston, AZ	0.05
Amache, CO	Poston, AZ	0.05
Denson, AR	Poston, AZ	0.08
Manzanar, CA	Poston, AZ	0.09
McGehee, AR	Poston, AZ	0.54
Heart Mountain, WY	Poston, AZ	0.06
Hunt, ID	Poston, AZ	0.16
Newell, CA	Poston, AZ	0.99
Topaz, UT	Poston, AZ	0.38
Amache, CO	Rivers, AZ	0.99
Denson, AR	Rivers, AZ	0.86
Manzanar, CA	Rivers, AZ	0.88
McGehee, AR	Rivers, AZ	0.89
Heart Mountain, WY	Rivers, AZ	1.00
Hunt, ID	Rivers, AZ	0.97
Newell, CA	Rivers, AZ	0.20
Topaz, UT	Rivers, AZ	0.04
Denson, AR	Amache, CO	0.98
Manzanar, CA	Amache, CO	1.00
McGehee, AR	Amache, CO	0.96
Heart Mountain, WY	Amache, CO	1.00
Hunt, ID	Amache, CO	1.00
Newell, CA	Amache, CO	0.10
Topaz, UT	Amache, CO	0.06
Manzanar, CA	Denson, AR	0.98
McGehee, AR	Denson, AR	0.86
Heart Mountain, WY	Denson, AR	0.95
Hunt, ID	Denson, AR	0.78
Newell, CA	Denson, AR	0.10
Topaz, UT	Denson, AR	0.53
McGehee, AR	Manzanar, CA	1.00
Heart Mountain, WY	Manzanar, CA	0.99
Hunt, ID	Manzanar, CA	1.00
Newell, CA	Manzanar, CA	0.17
Topaz, UT	Manzanar, CA	0.23
Heart Mountain, WY	McGehee, AR	0.87
Hunt, ID	McGehee, AR	1.00
Newell, CA	McGehee, AR	0.65
Topaz, UT	McGehee, AR	0.43
Hunt, ID	Heart Mountain, WY	0.94
Newell, CA	Heart Mountain, WY	0.13
Topaz, UT	Heart Mountain, WY	0.02
Newell, CA	Hunt, ID	0.29
Topaz, UT	Hunt, ID	0.09
Topaz, UT	Newell, CA	0.38

Table 15: T-Tests for Differences in Gender Proportion by Camp

Camp 1	Camp 2	Difference in Means	Standard Error	T	p-value	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Rivers, AZ	Poston, AZ	0.03	7.95	0.004	1.00	-15.63	15.64
Amache, CO	Poston, AZ	0.02	7.96	0.002	1.00	-15.65	15.65
Denson, AR	Poston, AZ	-0.04	5.81	-0.01	1.00	-11.47	11.46
Manzanar, CA	Poston, AZ	-0.04	7.52	-0.01	1.00	-14.79	14.78
McGehee, AR	Poston, AZ	0.01	7.03	0.001	1.00	-13.83	13.83
Heart Mountain, WY	Poston, AZ	0.03	8.15	0.004	1.00	-16.01	16.02
Hunt, ID	Poston, AZ	0.01	8.55	0.001	1.00	-16.79	16.80
Newell, CA	Poston, AZ	-0.005	7.75	-0.001	1.00	-15.23	15.23
Topaz, UT	Poston, AZ	0.04	7.42	0.01	1.00	-14.60	14.61
Amache, CO	Rivers, AZ	-0.01	7.24	-0.002	1.00	-14.23	14.23
Denson, AR	Rivers, AZ	-0.07	5.52	-0.01	0.99	-10.91	10.88
Manzanar, CA	Rivers, AZ	-0.07	6.90	-0.01	0.99	-13.58	13.56
McGehee, AR	Rivers, AZ	-0.03	6.52	-0.004	1.00	-12.84	12.83
Heart Mountain, WY	Rivers, AZ	-0.001	7.38	-0.0001	1.00	-14.50	14.50
Hunt, ID	Rivers, AZ	-0.02	7.67	-0.003	1.00	-15.07	15.07
Newell, CA	Rivers, AZ	-0.04	7.08	-0.005	1.00	-13.92	13.91
Topaz, UT	Rivers, AZ	0.01	6.83	0.001	1.00	-13.43	13.44
Denson, AR	Amache, CO	-0.05	5.52	-0.01	0.99	-10.90	10.88
Manzanar, CA	Amache, CO	-0.06	6.90	-0.01	0.99	-13.58	13.56
McGehee, AR	Amache, CO	-0.01	6.52	-0.002	1.00	-12.84	12.84
Heart Mountain, WY	Amache, CO	0.01	7.39	0.002	1.00	-14.52	14.52
Hunt, ID	Amache, CO	-0.01	7.68	-0.001	1.00	-15.09	15.09
Newell, CA	Amache, CO	-0.02	7.08	-0.003	1.00	-13.93	13.92
Topaz, UT	Amache, CO	0.02	6.84	0.003	1.00	-13.45	13.45
Manzanar, CA	Denson, AR	-0.01	5.30	-0.001	1.00	-10.47	10.47
McGehee, AR	Denson, AR	0.04	5.16	0.01	0.99	-10.18	10.20
Heart Mountain, WY	Denson, AR	0.07	5.59	0.01	0.99	-11.01	11.04
Hunt, ID	Denson, AR	0.05	5.70	0.01	0.99	-11.24	11.26
Newell, CA	Denson, AR	0.03	5.43	0.01	1.00	-10.71	10.72
Topaz, UT	Denson, AR	0.08	5.34	0.01	0.99	-10.52	10.55
McGehee, AR	Manzanar, CA	0.05	6.24	0.01	0.99	-12.28	12.30
Heart Mountain, WY	Manzanar, CA	0.07	7.03	0.01	0.99	-13.81	13.84
Hunt, ID	Manzanar, CA	0.05	7.27	0.01	0.99	-14.30	14.31
Newell, CA	Manzanar, CA	0.04	6.74	0.01	1.00	-13.25	13.26
Topaz, UT	Manzanar, CA	0.08	6.54	0.01	0.99	-12.86	12.88
Heart Mountain, WY	McGehee, AR	0.02	6.63	0.004	1.00	-13.04	13.05
Hunt, ID	McGehee, AR	0.004	6.83	0.001	1.00	-13.44	13.45
Newell, CA	McGehee, AR	-0.01	6.40	-0.002	1.00	-12.59	12.59
Topaz, UT	McGehee, AR	0.03	6.22	0.01	1.00	-12.24	12.25
Hunt, ID	Heart Mountain, WY	-0.02	7.84	-0.003	1.00	-15.42	15.41
Newell, CA	Heart Mountain, WY	-0.03	7.22	-0.005	1.00	-14.19	14.18
Topaz, UT	Heart Mountain, WY	0.01	6.95	0.001	1.00	-13.68	13.68
Newell, CA	Hunt, ID	-0.01	7.48	-0.002	1.00	-14.72	14.71
Topaz, UT	Hunt, ID	0.03	7.19	0.004	1.00	-14.14	14.15
Topaz, UT	Newell, CA	0.04	6.70	0.01	0.99	-13.17	13.18

## 12 Exogeneity Tests for Camp Assignment

In this section, we present several additional analyses showing that camp assignment was exogenous to pre-internment characteristics (such as age, gender, and pre-internment occupation).

### 12.1 K-S Tests

Plots of age, gender, and pre-internment occupations for internees held at different camps (displayed in Figures 8 and 9 and Table 15) reveal no significant differences in these distributions across different internment locations. We further conduct a series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests of the null hypothesis that observed age and sector of employment for internees imprisoned across different camps are draws from the same distribution broadly support the idea that internees are comparable across these dimensions.

There are 45 possible pairs of the 10 major camps to which Japanese Americans were assigned during the internment period. For age, our KS test results reject the null hypothesis of a single parent distribution in two of 45 cases (internees in Rohwer vs. Heart Mountain and Rohwer vs. Tule Lake). This is with the defined Type I error rate for these tests. For employment sector, we treat the 3-digit designations for occupational sector as a continuous covariate and test the distributions of these sectors for Nisei respondents across camps. Here, we reject the null hypothesis of a single distribution in four of 45 cases (internees in Poston vs. Rivers, Poston vs. Amache, Topaz vs. Rivers, and Topaz vs. Heart Mountain). Full results for these tests are presented in Tables 13 and 14. A series of t-tests for standardized differences in proportions never reject the null hypothesis that gender balance is nearly identical across all 45 possible pairs of internment camps.

Table 16: Covariate Balance Across Internment Camps

	Constant	Age	Gender (Male)	Pre-Camp Location
Jerome	-5.25	-.71	.95	.68
Heart Mountain	.47	.70	-.47	-.44
Minidoka	2.84	.27	.23	-.90
Manzanar	-2.11	.01	1.53	.09
Rohwer	-1.42	1.47	.43	-3.43
Tule Lake	-.56	.22	.55	-.54
Poston	5.22	-.26	.60	-.82
Gila River	.47	.17	-.42	-.46
Topaz	-1.91	.63	-.71	-.16

Note: Reference category is Granada (Amache)

## 12.2 Assignment to Places with Particular Political or Demographic Characteristics

Neither were internees assigned in a meaningful way to places with particular political or demographic characteristics. This is shown in Table 17, which shows the results of two separate OLS regressions of Democratic Party vote share (measured via Franklin Roosevelt's 1940 vote share) of the camp county (Model 1) and of percent white of the camp county (Model 2) on pre-internment characteristics and area of residence.

Table 17: Exogeneity Test for Location Assignment: Politics and Demographics

	FDR 1940 Vote Share	Pct. White
	(1)	(2)
Age	-.0002 (.0002)	-.01 (.02)
Gender (Male)	.01 (.01)	-.50 (.58)
Farmer	.02 (.02)	.63 (1.12)
Constant	.73*** (.02)	86.15*** (1.32)
Pre-Internment Location Fixed Effects	✓	✓
Observations	2,551	2,551
R <sup>2</sup>	.13	.08

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### 13 Recording of Pre-Internment Location

One important limitation for the JARP data is the fact that pre-internment location, in most cases outside of California, is recorded at the state level.<sup>13</sup> While it is plausible to assume that people living in a single city or county area would have had similar probabilities of camp assignment, it is less clear that this assumption might hold for everyone living in a given state.

To address this issue, we examine individual internee records provided by the WRA. We use this data to simulate more specific pre-internment locations for JARP respondents. We took the

<sup>13</sup>For California, JARP provides separate designations for people who lived in the state’s largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSA”) from people who lived in “rural clusters” throughout the state. These designations provide little additional information relative to the statewide code because they group jurisdictions across geographic areas. San Francisco and Los Angeles, for instance, are coded using the same value because both are large MSAs

following approach. First, we used the WRA data to calculate the empirical probabilities of having lived in specific areas within a state. For instance, according to the WRA records 6 Japanese Americans interned after 1941 had last-known addresses in Colorado before they were relocated: 4 in Rocky Falls, 1 in Fort Upton, and 1 in Greeley. For JARP respondents living in a given state, we drew a specific location from a multinomial distribution using these empirical probabilities at the family level. In our example, every member of a single family unit living in the state of Colorado would have a 67% probability of being assigned to Rocky Falls and 16% probabilities of being assigned to Fort Upton or Greeley, respectively. Not all family members in the JARP shared a pre-internment location, but we assumed that family members who did share a pre-internment code in the JARP survey would share a specific location. This means that we assumed all members of a given family living in Washington state in the JARP data might be assigned to Seattle if this was the specific location drawn for their family ID (but members of the same family living in California would all get a different, single assigned location in California)<sup>14</sup>.


We assigned every respondent in the JARP who was interned to a more specific pre-internment location using this procedure and re-estimated the effects of internment experience using the same approach described in Section 6. We repeated this procedure 1,000 times to get a distribution of effect sizes under a variety of assumed pre-internment locations for JARP survey respondents.

Figures 10 through 13 display the results of these simulations. The means of each plotted distribution can be interpreted as the average effect of witnessing violence, force, strikes, or heavily militarized camp conditions across 1,000 possible distributions of internees in the JARP across specific pre-internment locations, where distributions across locations are based on the real places in which Japanese Americans lived on the eve of internment as recorded by the WRA. We compare the coefficients and standard errors (for these results, standard errors are the standard deviations of the distribution of coefficients generated for each of 1,000 simulations) for these simulations to

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<sup>14</sup>Specific location assignments for California respondents are generated naïvely, meaning that we use the raw empirical probabilities of living in any WRA-designated sub-area of California instead of mapping between the JARP's regional California codes and the WRA's. The reason for this is that the lists of locations within California do not match exactly between the WRA and the JARP, and it is unclear how to assign specific locations to the "other California" category listed in the JARP

Figure 10: Distribution of Camp Effect on Level of Political Interest Using WRA Location Data



our original results explicitly in Table 9. The simulation produces very similar point estimates for the effects of various camp characteristics even under different assumed pre-internment locations, which provides support for plausible exogeneity of camp assignment.

Figure 11: Distribution of Camp Effect on Faith in Government Using WRA Location Data




Figure 12: Distribution of Camp Effect on Views of Leadership and Protest Using WRA Location Data




Figure 13: Distribution of Camp Effect on Political Communication Using WRA Location Data

